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TWO CHEERS FOR THE MARYLAND DIRECTOR AND 
OFFICER LIABILITY STATUTE 
Mark A. Sargentt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1986 the Delaware legislature unveiled a new weapon designed to 
protect Delaware's dominant position in the market for corporate 
franchises: a statute authorizing charter provisions that limit or eliminate 
the personal liability of directors for certain breaches of their fiduciary 
obligations. 1 Delaware was not the first state to enact new means of pro-
tecting corporate managers from liability,2 but its decision to deploy its 
own version of this state-of-the-art legal technology signaled its determi-
nation to remain the corporate home for thousands of corporations -
particularly public corporations - with their principal places of business 
located elsewhere. 3 Delaware's salvo triggered a multistate "arms race," 
t B.A., 1973, Wesleyan University; M.A., 1975, Cornell University; J.D., 1978, Cor-
nell Law School; Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. I would 
like to thank Dennis Honabach, Cyril Moscow, Arnold Rochvarg and Marc Stein-
berg for their comments, and Mary Sue Greisman for her research assistance. Apol-
ogies to E.M. Forster for the title. E. FORSTER, Two CHEERS FOR DEMOCRACY 
(1951). 
1. Act of June 18, 1986, ch. 289, § 2, 1985 Del. Laws 544 (codified at DEL CODE 
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988)). 
2. As part of a thorough revision of Virginia's corporation statute, the Virginia legisla-
ture in 1985 redefined the directors' standard of care in a manner intended to limit 
potential liability. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (Supp. 1988); Honabach, All 
That Glitters: A Critique of the Revised Virginia Stock Corporation Act, 12 1~ CORP. 
L. 433, 467-71 (1987) [hereinafter Honabach, All That Glitters]; King, Director Pro-
tection Under Virginia Law, 20 REV. SEc. & COMMODITIES REG. 129, 131-32 
(1987); Murphy, The New Virginia Stock Corporation Act: A Primer, 20 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 67, 105-10 (1985). 
An Indiana provision, adopted in 1986, provides that a director is not liable for 
breach of his fiduciary duty unless "[t]he breach or failure to perform constitutes 
willful misconduct or recklessness." IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e)(2) (Burns 
Supp. 1988). For comparison of this Indiana provision to other new state statutes 
altering liability standards, see Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability: A Pro-
posal/or Legislative Reform, 66 TEX. L. REv. 411, 444-46 (1987) [hereinafter Note, 
The Limitation of Directors' Liability]. 
In addition, the drafters of the American Law Institute's Principles of Corpo-
rate Governance considered the possibility of a statutory cap on directors' liability 
as early as 1982. See ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND STRUC-
TURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, PART VII ch. I, at 225-40 (Tent. 
Draft No. 1, 1982); see a/so ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 7.16, at 200-23 (Discussion Draft No. 1, 
1985) [hereinafter ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS); /d. § 7.17, at 223-50 
(Tent. Draft No. 6, 1986); /d. § 7.17, at 25-65 (1987). For differing views of the 
ALI project's approach to this question, see Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Gov-
ernance: An Essay on Steering Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 789 (1984) [hereinafter Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance]; Cox, 
Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative Suit Proce-
dures, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 745 (1984); Scott, Corporation Law and the Ameri-
can Law Institute Corporate Governance Project, 35 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1983). 
3. Delaware's impact on the market for corporate franchises has been a matter of in-
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as state after state hastened to enact its own version of the Delaware 
statute or to find even more radical means of protecting corporate man-
agers from liability to the corporation and its shareholders.4 
This arms race resulted, of course, from the fear that corporations 
organized under the laws of other states would reincorporate in Dela-
ware to take advantage of the increased level of protection provided by 
the new law. 5 This phenomenon has been characterized by one commen-
tator as "the race to the bottom - the second lap. " 6 Whether one agrees 
with the highly pejorative connotations of that label, it is fair to say that 
Delaware has forced the issue, causing many states to respond precip-
itously to a perceived "crisis" in managerial liabilities that is obscure in 
tense concern. See Baysinger & Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of 
the Firm, 28 J. L. & EcoN. 179 (1985); Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Re-
flections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Fischel, The "Race to the Bot-
tom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 
76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982); Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory 
of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987); Romano, Law as a Prod-
uct: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, l J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 225 (1985); Selig-
man, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of /899, l DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 249 (1976). With respect to the Delaware legislature's motives for enact-
ing liability limiting legislation, see Comment, Delaware Amendment Relaxes Direc-
tors' Liability, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. Ill, 117 (1987) ("[T]he Delaware 
legislature adopted the new amendment in response to the recent threat to Dela-
ware's profitable position in the incorporation market arising out of the shortage of 
Directors' and Officers' liability insurance."); see also Sparks, Delaware's D & 0 
Liability Law: Other States Should Follow Suit, Legal Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 10, 
col. l (chair of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware Bar Association defined 
recent judicial decisions as cause for new legislation). 
4. For a survey of those legislative responses, see Hanks, Evaluating Recent State Leg-
islation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. 
LAW. 1207, 1246-53 (1988). 
5. See, for example, the comments of two of the drafters of expanded indemnification 
provisions under the Wisconsin statute (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 180.044, 180.048 
(West Supp. 1988)): "The [drafting] committee ... believes that if Wisconsin does 
not act promptly, it risks losing the corporate domiciles, and perhaps the headquar-
ters and executive personnel, of many of its major corporations to states which have 
already acted in response to director and officer liability concerns." Ware & Wil-
liams, Director and Officer Liability, A Concern of Wisconsin Lawyers and Corpora-
tions, Wis. BAR BULL, Dec. 1986, at 9, 12. A proponent of new corporate liability 
legislation for Michigan argued that "Michigan does not want corporations leaving 
the state and reincorporating in states, like Delaware, with more advantageous lia-
bility, indemnification, and insurance statutes." Comment, Director Liability: 
Michigan's Response to Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1039, 1065 
(1987). The fear that reincorporations might rise in Delaware as a result of the 
enactment of its new liability-limiting legislation was not unfounded. See Compa-
nies Gear Up to Take Advantage of Del. Break on Liability, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 16, 
1987, at 2F, col. 4 ("[T]he number of businesses newly incorporating in Delaware 
has been growing somewhat more quickly than usual since the new law went into 
effect."). /d. at col. 5. 
6. Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom - The Second 
Lap, 66 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1987). For another critical discussion of the recent devel-
opments, see Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919 
(1988). 
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its origins and uncertain in its effects. 7 One of the few states where the 
legislature at least initially resisted this stampede was Maryland. 
In the Spring of 1987, a bill intended to limit the liability of the 
directors of Maryland corporations was introduced in the Maryland leg-
islature.8 This bill departed substantially from the Delaware model,9 and 
soon encountered serious opposition. 10 The fate of this bill would offer 
an interesting case study in the political economy of corporate legislation, 
but suffice it to say that the 1987 bill engendered great resistance and 
died in the House Judiciary Committee. 11 
This result produced chagrin in some Maryland business and legal 
circles 12 and led to a renewed effort in 1988 to enact corporate liability-
limiting legislation. 13 This time the effort succeeded, 14 in part because 
the 1988 legislation bore a greater resemblance to the well-established 
7. See infra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
8. Md. Senate Bill No. 223 (1987); Md. House Bill No. 242 (1987); see also Sia, Liabil-
ity Shield Pushed for Company Directors, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 5, 1987, at 12C, col. 2. 
The drafters of the bill obviously were worried that the failure to enact some form of 
liability-limiting legislation would lead to the reincorporation of Maryland corpora-
tions in Delaware. See Glasgow, Changes in Liability Laws to Shield Directors 
Called Critical to Companies, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 11, 1987, at lG, col. 4. One of 
the proponents of the bill "said he has made a list of a dozen companies that ... 
have announced their intention to reincorporate in Delaware." /d. at 4G, col. 6. 
9. For example, the legislation proposed in the 1987 bill would have created a 
mandatory limit on liability for directors with no requirement of shareholder ap-
proval. The bill also omitted a broad exclusion from coverage of the limitation for 
duty of loyalty violations. See Md. Senate Bill No. 223 (1987); Md. House Bill No. 
242 (1987); cj. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). 
10. See Sia, Judiciary Panel is Skeptical of Liability Package, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 18, 
1988, at liB, col. 5. 
11. See Sia, Schaefer Rebuffed on Key Liability Bill, Baltimore Sun, Mar. 15, 1987, at 
lA, col. 4. 
12. See Shelsby, Reincorporation in Del. is a Bitter Solution to Law, Baltimore Sun, May 
3, 1987, at IF, col. 6; Winchurch, Directors' Liability Debated, Daily Record (Balti-
more), June 3, 1987, at 3, col. 1. Even the Baltimore Sun wrung its editorial hands 
over the House Judiciary Committee's action. See Stop the Move to Delaware!, Bal-
timore Sun, May 12, 1987, at lOA, col. 1. 
13. See Zorzi, Revamped Bill on Corporate Liability Pushed, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 20, 
1988, at lC, col. 3; Zorzi, Committee Passes Limit on Liability, Baltimore Sun, Jan. 
27, 1988, at lG, col. 6. 
14. See Zorzi, Corporate Liability Curb Signed, Baltimore Sun, Feb. 19, 1988, at IF, col. 
6. The legislation enacted was Senate Bill 223 (1987), adding a new Mo. CORPS. & 
Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988), and amending Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS 
CODE ANN.§§ 2-104(b), 2-405.l(c), and 2-418(b), (e)(l), (f), (g), (k) (Supp. 1988). 
This legislation not only created a limitation on liability for corporate managers, it 
liberalized the Maryland statute's indemnification provisions. This article will not 
discuss these new indemnification provisions in detail. For more detailed discus-
sion, see Honabach, Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation-A 
Commentary on Maryland's New Director and Officer Liability Limiting and Indem-
nification Legislation, 18 U. BA.LT. L. REV. 310, 328-31 (1989) [hereinafter 
Honabach, Consent and Exit]. For discussion of Delaware's comparable provisions, 
see Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Delaware Supports Directors With a Three-Legged 
Stool of Limited Liability, Indemnification, and Insurance, 42 Bus. LAW. 399, 404-
17 (1987). 
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Delaware model. There are, however, some very important differences 
between the two pieces of legislation. 
New section 2-405.2 of the Corporations and Associations Article of 
the Maryland Annotated Code15 resembles section 102(b)(7) of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law 16 insofar as they are both charter-option 
statutes that enable the shareholders to adopt charter provisions limiting 
the personal liability of directors to the corporation or its shareholders. 
The Maryland statute departs from the Delaware model, however, by 
authorizing limitations on the liability of officers as well as of directors. 
More importantly, the Maryland statute does not track the Delaware 
statute's broad exclusion of breaches of the duty of loyalty from coverage 
of the liability limitation. The Maryland statute allows the liability limi-
tation to apply to breaches of that duty except in cases of receipt of "an 
15. This section provides that: 
(a)E.ffect of corporate charter - The charter of the corporation may in-
clude any provision expanding or limiting the liability of its directors and 
officers to the corporation or its stockholders for money damages but may 
not include any provision which restricts or limits the liability of its direc-
tors or officers to the corporation or its stockholders: 
(1) To the extent that it is proved that the person actually received 
an improper benefit or profit in money, property, or services, for the 
amount of the benefit or profit in money, property, or services actually 
received; 
(2) To the extent that a judgment or other final adjudication adverse 
to the person is entered in a proceeding based on a finding in the proceed-
ing that the person's action, or failure to act, was the result of active and 
deliberate dishonesty and was material to the cause of action adjudicated 
in the proceeding. . . . 
MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1988). 
Subsection (b) of section 2-405.2 provides further that the section does not ap-
ply to actions brought against directors or officers of specified financial institutions. 
/d. § 2-405.2(b). This provision is obviously a concession to sensitivities born of the 
recent scandals in Maryland's savings and loan industry. See Batoff, Maryland's 
Savings and Loan Crisis of 1985: The Resulting Legislative Reform, 16 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 403 (1987). Subsection (c) of section 2-405.2 provides that "[t]his section may 
not be construed to affect the liability of a person in any capacity other than the 
person's capacity as a director or officer." Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-
405.2(c) (Supp. 1988). 
16. Section 102(b )(7) of Title 8 of the Delaware Annotated Code allows shareholders to 
adopt: 
A provision eliminating or limiting the personal liability of a director to 
the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for breach of 
fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such·provision shall not elimi-
nate or limit the liability of a director: (i) For any breach of the director's 
duty of loyalty to the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omis-
sions not in good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a know-
ing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or (iv) for any 
transaction from which the director derived an improper personal benefit. 
No such provision shall eliminate or limit the liability of a director for any 
act or omission occurring prior to the date when such provision becomes 
effective. All references in this paragraph to a director shall also be 
deemed to refer to a member of the governing body of a corporation which 
is not authorized to issue capital stock. 
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (Supp. 1988). 
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improper benefit or profit in money, property, or services" 17 or in cases 
of "active and deliberate dishonesty." 18 The liability-limiting effect of 
the Maryland statute is thus broader than that of the Delaware statute 
insofar as it applie& to some breaches of the duty of loyalty as well as to 
breaches of the duty of care. 
The Maryland statute is naturally of interest as a departure in 
Maryland corporate law, but its significance transcends that narrow con-
cern. Like all of the liability legislation enacted in recent years, it raises 
important questions about the role of liability rules in corporate govern-
ance.19 Furthermore, the difference between Delaware's and Maryland's 
statutory treatment of duty of loyalty violations requires rethinking the 
traditional distinction between that duty and the duty of care. Any eval-
uation of the Maryland statute necessitates consideration of all of these 
fundamental issues. · 
This article's analysis of those issues will lead to the conclusion that 
the Maryland statute deserves some praise. The statutory authorization 
of a limitation on liability for breaches of the duty of care is not inimical 
to shareholder welfare. It actually represents a useful means of aligning 
the interests of the shareholders and the managers of public corporations. 
The statute deserves something less than three cheers, however, because 
its failure to distinguish broadly between the duties of care and loyalty 
for purposes of the limitation on liability constitutes an unjustifiable re-
pudiation of a well-established and useful distinction. 
Part II of this article begins the analysis by explaining how the tradi-
tional function of the duty of care as an aspirational rather than a liabil-
ity-generating rule maximizes shareholder welfare, and how that 
traditional function is reinforced by the new statute's limitation on liabil-
ity for breach of the duty of care. The discussion focuses primarily on 
the duties and liabilities of corporate directors, with particular emphasis 
17. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a)(1) (Supp. 1988). 
18. Id. § 2-405.2(a)(2). The Maryland statute also contains other specific exclusions 
from coverage of the liability limitation. For discussion, see Honabach, Consent and 
Exit, supra note 14, at 315. 
19. These questions have received considerable attention. See, e.g., Gelb, Director Due 
Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMPLE L. REv. 13 (1988); 
Hanks, supra note 4; Hazen, supra note 6; Honabach, All That Glitters, supra note 2, 
at 463-80; Lee, Limiting Corporate Directors' Liability: Delaware's Section 102(b)(7) 
and the Erosion of the Directors' Duty of Care, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 239 (1987); 
Linsley, Statutory Limitations on Directors' Liability in Delaware: A New Look at 
Conflicts of Interest and the Business Judgment Rule, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527 
(1987); Mallen & Evans, Surviving the Directors' and Officers' Liability Crisis: In-
surance and the Alternatives, 12 DEL J. CoRP. L. 439 (1987); Schaffer, Delaware's 
Limit on Director Liability: How the Market for Incorporation Shapes Corporate law, 
10 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 666 (1987); Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, supra note 
14; Comment, Statutory and Non-Statutory Responses to the Director and Officer 
Liability Insurance Crisis, 63 IND. L.J. 181 (1987); Comment, Limiting Directors' 
Duty of Care Liability: An Analysis of Delaware's Charter Amendment Approach, 20 
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 543 (1987); Note, The Limitation of Directors' Liability, supra 
note 2. 
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on the directors of public corporations, leaving consideration of close 
corporations and the special case of corporate officers to Part IV. Part 
III describes how the Maryland statute's failure to exclude broadly duty 
of loyalty violations from coverage of the liability limitation implicitly 
collapses the real and important distinction between the two duties. Part 
III argues further that this distinction should be preserved and that the 
limitation on liability should be applied only to duty of care violations. 
Part IV briefly analyzes the justifications for allowing limitation of the 
liability of corporate officers and considers the implications of the Mary-
land statute for closely-held corporations. 
II. PROTECTING DIRECTORS AGAINST LIABILITY FOR 
BREACH OF THE DUTY OF CARE: REINFORCING 
THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH 
A. The Rhetoric of Care and the Realities of Directorial Liability 
Corporation statutes typically impose a duty ofcare upon corporate 
directors, although they tend not to use that term. Section 8.30(a) of the 
Revised Model Business Corporation Act, for example, states that a "di-
rector shall discharge his duties as a director ... with the care an ordina-
rily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar 
circumstances .... " 20 Section 2-405.1 of the Maryland Corporation stat-· 
ute is quite similar.21 By defining the directors' obligation to the corpo-
ration in terms of a standard of care and phrasing that standard in the 
language of ordinary negligence, the statutes suggest that directors rou-
tinely face personal liability for breach of the duty of care. 
The converse, of course, is closer to the truth. Corporate. directors 
do not routinely or even frequently incur personal liability for breach of 
the duty of care.22 Such liability is, quite simply, very rare. 23 As ex-
plained below, the courts have used a few substantive doctrines and pro-
cedural devices to minimize the risks of liability for breach of the duty of 
20. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.30(a) (3d ed. 1985); see also CAL. CORP. 
CODE§ 309(a) (1977 & West Supp. 1988) ("(W]ith such care, including reasonable 
inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
circumstances."). 
21. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. § 2-405.1 (1985). This section provides: 
(a) In general. - A director shall perform his duties as a director, in-
cluding his duties as a member of a committee of the board on which he 
serves: 
/d. 
(l) In good faith; 
(2) In a manner he reasonably believes to be in the interest of the corpo-
ration; and 
(3) With the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position 
would use under similar circumstances. 
22. This point has been made so many times that copious citation is unnecessary. But 
see Lee, supra note 19, at 239-40. 
23. See infra notes 28-29 and accompanying text. 
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care while preserving the rhetoric of care.24 This apparent tension be-
tween the statutory articulation of a standard and the lack of any sub-
stantial risk of liability for failing to meet that standard has led some 
commentators to describe the duty of care as having a "bark worse than 
its bite,"25 leading a "twilight existence,"26 or, in an oft-quoted phrase, 
resembling the shearing of the pig: "much squealing, little wool."27 
Whether one regards this state of affairs with alarm or approval, it 
remains indisputable that the corporation statutes' unequivocal procla-
mation of the duty of care has produced few cases holding directors lia-
ble for breach of the duty of care. The short list of such cases compiled 
by Professor Bishop in 196828 has not been swelled by an influx of new 
cases,29 despite the growing sensitivity in the last two decades to the gen-
eral problem of corporate governance and to the special problem of how 
corporate managers should respond to hostile takeovers.30 The tradi-
tional judicial reticence toward duty of care claims persists, and the 
courts remain reluctant to assign personal liability to directors except in 
cases where there is at least an undertone of breach of the duty of loy-
alty.31 This was true even in Smith v. Van Gorkom,32 the now famous 
24. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text. 
25. Lee, supra note 19, at 240. 
26. Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 796. 
27. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Cor-
porate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095 (1968). 
28. /d. at 1099-1100 (citing New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau v. Weiss, 305 
N.Y. 1, 110 N.E.2d 397 (1953); Syracuse Television, Inc. v. Channel 9, Syracuse, 
Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Clayton v. Farish, 191 Misc. 
136, 73 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1947); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp. of Am., 423 
Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634 (1966)). 
29. In an effort to update Bishop's list, Lee found only three additional cases as of 
December 1983. Lee, supra note 19, at 244 n. 17 (citing DePinto v. Provident Sec. 
Life Ins. Co., 374 F.2d 37 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Heit v. 
Bixby, 276 F. Supp. 217 (E.D. Mo. 1967); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119 
(Del. Ch. 1971)). Three notorious cases should perhaps be added to the list. See 
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 
N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). 
Coffee has commented that measuring the importance of the duty of care by 
listing reported decisions underestimates the role of settlements. Coffee, Litigation 
and Corprate Governance, supra note 2, at 796. He makes this point in order to 
emphasize that the duty of care is not a "nullity," and that it has an important 
"educational and socializing effect." Coffee is surely correct in this estimation of the 
value of the duty of care, as will be argued below. See infra text accompanying 
notes 43, 90-91. His observation that there must be some undetermined number of 
settlements of duty of care claims, however, does not negate the basic point that the 
duty of care has not been a major liability generating rule. It is merely consistent 
with his persuasive argument that a largely aspirational or precatory duty of care 
still has an important "socializing and exhortative impact." Coffee, Litigation and 
Corprate Governance, supra note 2, at 798. 
30. The immense literature on this topic is summarized and evaluated in R. GILSON, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 696-815 (1986). 
31. This phenomenon has been noted by several commentators. See, e.g., R. CLARK, 
CORPORATE LAw 126 (1986) ("[T]he facts suggest that the directors were actually 
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case which seemed to some to be such an anomalous threat to the tradi-
tional equilibrium. 33 
The means by which the courts have maintained the traditional 
equilibrium between the rhetoric of care and limited actual liability are 
no mystery. A principal means has been the articulation of the standard 
in relatively forgiving terms.34 Statutory provisions such as section 8.30 
of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act allow the courts sub-
stantial flexibility and opportunity for leniency by defining the standard 
in terms of an "ordinarily prudent person in a like position under similar 
circumstances. " 35 The Delaware courts have pushed this tendency even 
further by defining the standard of care applicable to directors of Dela-
ware corporations in terms of gross negligence. 36 
The key to the equilibrium, however, has been the business judg-
ment rule. 37 The precise verbal formulation of that rule varies from ju-
being sued and held liable because of wrongful self-interested conduct - for a viola-
tion of their fiduciary duty of loyalty . ... ")(emphasis in original); W. KLEIN & J. 
COFFEE, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRIN-
CIPLES 146 n. 25 (3d ed. 1988) (identifying duty of loyalty undertones in Francis and 
Van Gorkom); Cohn, Demise of the Director's Duty of Care: Judicial Avoidance of 
Standards and Sanctions Through the Business Judgment Rule, 62 TEX. L. REv. 
591, 593 (1983) (discussing courts reluctance to find breaches of the duties of care 
when defendants not motivated by self-enrichment); Kennedy, The Standard of Re-
sponsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 624,631 (1984) ("[I]t has been 
commonplace that most decisions in which directors have been held liable on due-
care grounds also involved either dishonesty or egregious inattention."). 
32. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). This decision is also sometimes referred to as the "Trans 
Union" case, after the corporation involved in the case. The Delaware Supreme 
Court held the directors of a public corporation liable for approving the acquisition 
of the corporation, albeit at a price substantially higher than the market price, be-
cause they did not adequately consider the possibility of better offers from other 
bidders. /d. at 879-80, 884. 
33. See, e.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. 
LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985) ("(O]ne of the worst decisions in the history of corporate 
law .... ");Veasey & Seitz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Revised Model Act, 
the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project- A Strange Porridge, 63 TEX. L. REV. 
1483 (1985); but see Prickett, An Explanation of Trans Union to "Benny-Penny" 
and Her Friends, 10 DEL J. CoRP. L. 451, 452 (1985) (Trans Union was "not only 
correctly decided, but is a sound precedent, reaffirming the basic obligation of due 
care owed by corporate directors to stockholders."). 
34. For a summary of historical and state-to-state variations in the articulation of the 
standard of care, see Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, An Historical 
Perspective on the Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty, and the Business Judgment 
Rule, 40 VAND. L. REV. 605, 606-13 (1987). 
35. 2 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30(a) (3d ed. 1985). 
36. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 
A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
37. For discussion of the business judgment rule, see generally E. BRODSKY & M. 
ADAMSKI, LAW OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS: RIGHTS, DUTIES 
AND LIABILITIES ch. 2 (1984); R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986); H. 
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER ENTERPRISES 
§ 242 (3d ed. 1983). It is sometimes said that there is a distinction between the 
"business judgment rule" which shields directors from personal liability, and the 
"business judgment doctrine" which shields the directors' decision from judicial re-
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risdiction to jurisdiction, and there are some substantive differences 
among the various versions of the rule, 38 but the essence of the rule is 
clear. The business judgment rule, in effect, protects directors from per-
sonal liability for mistakes of business judgment so long as no conflict of 
interest was present and the director's decision was intended to serve the 
business purposes of the corporation. The rule thus shields a vast range 
of directorial decisions from meaningful judicial review and effectively 
insulates directors from personal liability for breach of the duty of care. 
The courts' commitment to the business judgment rule over the years has 
been unbending. Only recently has the enormous pressure of a volatile 
market for corporate control on traditional canons of corporate govern-
ance produced any equivocation, and that equivocation has been modest. 
Some courts, following Delaware's lead, have attached a "procedural 
precondition"39 to the application of the rule, requiring directors to show 
that they followed appropriate procedures in informing themselves of the 
merits of the business decision.40 As a practical matter, this precondition 
requires directors, particularly those confronting control transactions, to 
engage in the ritual of consulting lawyers, investment bankers, appraisers 
and other experts in a deliberate and highly structured manner.41 The 
ultimate value of constructing these elegant and expensive paper trails is 
a matter of dispute, but they have become in many cases an essential first 
step toward invoking the business judgment rule. Once that rule is suc-
cessfully invoked, directors can enjoy the traditional level of protection 
from liability for mistakes in business judgment.42 In short, recent judi-
view. This distinction is articulated in Hinsey, Business Judgment and the American 
Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project: the Rule, the Doctrine and the Real-
ity, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609 (1984), but has not been developed in the case law. 
It may be, however, that the enactment of a statutory limit on liability in effect 
codifies the distinction. See Honabach, All that Glitters, supra note 2, at 467 n.206. 
38. Those differences are summarized in Special Project, supra note 34, at 606-13. 
39. See W. KLEIN AND J. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 147. 
40. /d. The principal case so holding is Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 881 (Del. 
1985). 
41. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 147-48. 
42. In the takeover context, however, a target board's defensive actions will be subjected 
to a "proportionality" test that constitutes an "intermediate" standard of review 
somewhere between the traditional business judgment approach and a more radical 
requirement that the board prove the "intrinsic fairness" of its actions. See Gilson 
& Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Proportion-
ality Review, 44 Bus. LAW. 247 (1989). This development in Delaware law is prob-
ably of greater significance than Van Gorkom's creation of a procedural 
precondition to application of the business judgment rule. As explained in the text, 
that precondition can be satisfied through the implementation of procedures that by 
now have become routine, albeit expensive. The proportionality test, in contrast, 
requires the board to prove that its defensive tactics were "reasonable in relation to 
the threat posed" by a hostile offer. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, 493 A.2d 946, 955 
(Del. 1985). This requirement raises serious interpretive problems that render the 
future course of Delaware law unclear and create substantial uncertainty for those 
structuring defensive tactics. The development of the proportionality test, there-
fore, represents a more substantial departure from the tradition of deference to busi-
ness judgment than does Van Gorkom's procedural precondition. It is unlikely, 
1989] Officer Liability Statute 287 
cial decisions may have generated new levels of anxiety, but the directors' 
duty of care is still largely aspirational or precatory in character and 
generally does not function as a routine basis for liability.43 
This state of affairs has received its share of criticism. The impact of 
the business judgment rule on the duty of care has seemed to some to be 
yet another example of how state corporate law has avoided its obligation 
to protect shareholders, particularly shareholders in public corporations, 
from the negligence and ineptitude of corporate directors who do not 
direct.44 The flexible and forgiving standard of care, coupled with the 
barrier posed by the business judgment rule, figure in this perspective as 
yet more crumbled milestones on the race to the bottom. A closer look, 
however, leads to the conclusion that these long-standing limitations are 
actually in the best interests of shareholders. 
B. A Defense of the Traditional Limits on Directorial Liability 
The legal rules that virtually foreclose personal liability for directo-
rial breach of the duty of care are sometimes justified in terms of the 
inherent limitations of the courts' perspective and experience.45 Judicial 
reluctance to second-guess business decisions that the judge would not be 
however, that application of the proportionality test will lead to greater personal 
liability for directors and officers. It simply increases the possibility that particular 
defensive tactics will be enjoined. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, 
Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. 1986) (enjoining coercive issuer self-tender). 
43. Characterizing the duty of care as "aspirational" or "precatory" does not mean that 
the duty is unimportant or that references to it should be eliminated from the corpo-
rate codes. Scott has argued that the duty should be abolished. See Scott, supra 
note 2, at 932-37. Although Scott's argument that the duty of care should not be a 
basis for routine negligence liability is sound, Coffee's argument that some affirma-
tive articulation of the duty is still necessary is also valid. See Coffee, Litigation and 
Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 798; see also supra note 29. As Coffee points 
out, the existence of a statutory limit on liability may strike the balance between the 
need for an aspirational body of law that communicates appropriate standards of 
behavior to the relevant audience and the need to avoid exposing "corporate officials 
to a threat of liability that may either chill the movement toward independent direc-
tors or produce excessive risk aversion." Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Govern-
ance, supra note 2, at 799. In addition, breaches of the duty of care can be a basis 
for injunctive or equitable relief, so the effect of the duty is not entirely aspirational. 
This fact alone undermines any argument that the duty should be abolished. 
44. The classic statement of this position is William 0. Douglas' famous article, Direc-
tors Who do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REv. 1305 (1934). Among the inheritors of 
this perspective are Hazen, Schwartz and Steinberg. See Hazen, supra note 6, at 179 
("Because directors manage the shareholders' investment, they should be accounta-
ble for their misdeeds. The age-old analogy of corporate directors to trustees is not 
misplaced."); Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of 
Professors Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 322, 323 (1986) ("Liability 
rules, enforced by shareholder litigation, are theoretically sound and profoundly af-
fect the conduct of corporate managers .... "); Steinberg, supra note 6, at 923-27 
(criticizing the Maryland and Delaware statutes for their "evisceration" of the duty 
of care). 
45. See, e.g., Special Project, supra note 34, at 616 ("[C]ourts have neither the ability 
nor the desire to substitute their judgment for that of more experienced 
professionals."). 
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competent to make reflects a becoming modesty. Although plausible, 
this justification does not explain why courts should be unwilling to re-
view managerial decisions when they are regularly willing to second-
guess, through reliance on expert testimony, the decisions of physicians, 
industrial designers and other professionals engaged in complex, techni-
cal and sophisticated decision-making. The justification must lie 
elsewhere. 
To a large extent, these liability limiting rules are an expression of 
the specialization of functions within the nexus of contracts encapsulated 
in the public corporation. 46 Shareholders are both the residual claimants 
and the primary risk-bearers within the corporation. Directors of public 
corporations provide a specialized kind of managerial service which pub-
lic shareholders are not able to provide. A substantial amount of defer-
ence by both shareholders and the courts to the decisions made by 
directors is thus wholly appropriate. This assumption does not ignore 
the existence of agency costs or the need for aspirational statements of 
fiduciary principles as structural elements in the relationship between 
shareholders and directors of public corporations; it merely suggests that 
the risk of liability for negligence, as distinct from disloyalty, should not 
be routine. 
Minimization of the directors' risk of personal liability for negli-
gence, furthermore, is actually in the shareholders' interest. Sharehold-
ers in public corporations, generally speaking, are willing to accept a 
certain quantum of firm-specific risk, including the risk that managers' 
performances will be suboptimal, because their access to the capital mar-
kets allows them to diversify their firm-specific risk.47 From an ex ante 
perspective, therefore, shareholders would prefer that directors approve 
at least some relatively risky projects. Directors, on the other hand, tend 
to be risk averse, since responsibility for the poor outcome of a risky 
project may be laid at their door, regardless of the reason for the poor 
outcome, while the net gains of a positive outcome will be appropriated 
by the residual claimant, the shareholder. This tendency toward risk 
aversion, which is not in the shareholders' interest, would be exacerbated 
by legal rules that routinely impose liability for breach of the duty of 
care. The net effect would be a transfer of risk from more efficient to less 
efficient risk-bearers. 
Rules that reduce directors' potential liability for breach of the duty 
of care, furthermore, are consistent with rules that facilitate, or at least 
do not discourage, negligence actions against outside contractors such as 
46. The literature on the modern theory of the firm from which this assumption is de-
rived is extensive. For citations to part of that literature, see Honabach, All That 
Glitters, supra note 2, at 439 n.25. 
47. This argument is derived largely from Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability 
Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analy-
sis, 71 CORNELL L. REv. 261, 265-66, 270-74 (1986); see also Coffee, Litigation and 
Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 802. 
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lawyers or investment bankers. Those professionals can absorb the risk 
of personal liability into their cost of doing business by charging their 
many clients a price that reflects the risk. 48 In other words, they can 
spread their risk of liability. In contrast, directors invest their human 
capital in only one or a small number of firms, and are thus relatively 
inefficient cost-avoiders. As such, they are poor candidates for negli-
gence-based personal liability.49 
It might be argued that this preoccupation with risk preferences in 
public corporations ignores the need for negligence-based liability rules 
as a means of controlling agency costs in a context that discourages mon-
itoring and inhibits coordinated action by shareholders. It might be ar-
gued further that negligence-based liability rules are an essential means 
of enforcing the fiduciary obligations on which shareholders in public 
corporations must rely if they are to be spared the transactional costs of 
writing contracts that specify in detail the duties of directors. 50 It is 
probably fair to say, however, that such arguments not only ignore or 
underestimate the threat to shareholder welfare created by exacerbating 
directorial risk aversion, but also disregard the tendency of market incen-
tives to align the interests of directors and shareholdersY Such market 
incentives may not be sufficient to control loyalty problems, 52 but the 
traditional approach to the duty of care seems consistent with the share-
holders' own interests. 
In addition, the argument for increasing the risk of directorial liabil-
ity for violations of the duty of care reflects a misunderstanding of the 
inherent structural limitations on the ability of outside directors to carry 
out their monitoring function. Bayless Manning has shown how control 
by corporate officers over the vast amounts of information generated by a 
public corporation necessarily limits the directors' ability to perceive, 
conceptualize and prioritize the wide range of problems facing the corpo-
48. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 802-03. The abil-
ity of other professionals, such as physicians, to absorb the risk of personal liability 
into their cost of doing business may be diminishing as the cost of medical malprac-
tice insurance increases. See Blair & Dewar, How to End the Crisis in Medical Mal-
practice Insurance, 31 CHALLENGE 36, 37 (1988) (survey and discussion of 
"premium explosion" for Florida physicians). The net result may be a flight from 
particularly precarious areas of medical practice, a phenomenon perhaps analogous 
to the flight of outside directors from corporate boards. 
49. See Coffee, Litigation and Corporate Governance, supra note 2, at 802-03; see also 
Hanks, supra note 4, at 1232-34. 
50. Among those commentators who emphasize the function of fiduciary duty as an 
implied standard term in the corporate "contract" are Easterbrook & Fischel, Close 
Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REv. 271, 291-97 (1986) [hereinafter 
Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations]. 
51. For extensive discussion of the role of markets in corporate governance, see Sympo-
sium on the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 1-471 (1983). See also 
Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and Evidence, 9 
DEL J. CORP. L. 540 (1984) (summarizing both the theories and the empirical 
evidence). 
52. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94. 
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ration and to take appropriate initiatives. 53 When those inherent infor-
mational disadvantages are taken into account, the courts' reluctance to 
second-guess directors' business decisions, as distinguished from other 
kinds of decisions, is perhaps more comprehensible. 54 
The traditional approach is not only sound as a matter of policy, it is 
largely effective in meeting its goal of protecting directors against the 
routine risk of personal liability for the poor outcomes of their good faith 
business decisions. If that is the case, it is fair to ask why forty-odd 
states55 hastily enacted a profusion of new statutes intended to provide 
further protection for corporate directors. 
C The "Crisis" in Liability and the Reinforcement of the Traditional 
Approach 
The conventional explanation for the recent spate of liability legisla-
tion has been that a "crisis" in directors' liability forced Delaware to 
enact its version of liability limiting legislation, 56 and that the dynamics 
of the market for corporate franchises has led many other states either to 
fall in line behind Delaware or to develop statutes of greater breadth and 
novelty. 5 7 The linchpin of that argument, of course, is the assumption 
53. Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time 
for Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1481-82, 1484 (1984). 
[T)he question of what the board will discuss and act on is typically deter-
mined by the management or by the corporation's automatic built-in secu-
lar equivalent of an ecclesiastical calendar, that is, shareholders' meeting 
date, fiscal year, cycle of audit committee meetings, and similar mat-
ters. . . . [T]he board itself has little capacity to generate significant pro-
posals, other than generalized suggestions looking toward the 
establishment of procedures or systems. Almost all of what a board does 
is made up of matters that are brought to it; matters generated by the 
board itself are very rare. Typically, boards cannot take, and are not ex-
pected to take, initiatives. 
/d. at 1484; see also id. at 1485-86 (courts should defer to the board's judgment as to 
how far to extend the scope of its inquiry into the information available to direc-
tors). "No one believes that a director should be able with impunity simply to ig-
nore the work of the board, never doing his homework; but the director's judgment 
as to the scope of inquiry called for in the circumstances is itself a business judgment 
of the most basic character." /d. at 1486. For discussions of some of the other 
consequences of directors' (particularly outside directors') informational disadvan-
tages, see Brudney, The Independent Director - Heavenly City or Potemkin Vil-
lage?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 633 (1982); Coffee, Beyond the Shut-eyed Sentry: 
Toward a Theoretical View of Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Re-
sponse, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1131 (1977). 
54. For an impassioned argument that the peculiar nature of the board's exercise of 
business judgment makes judicial intervention wholly inappropriate, see Manning, 
supra note 53, at 1490-91. 
55. For a count current as of the spring of 1988, see Hanks, supra note 4, at 1246-53. 
56. See, e.g., Wiggins, Delaware's D & 0 Liability Law: A "Windfall" for Directors, 
Legal Times, Aug. 18, 1986, at 11, col. 1. 
57. See Hazen, supra note 6, at 171-72; Schaffer, supra note 19, at 675-77. The degree of 
sensitivity to the.risk of reincorporation in Delaware or other states may vary from 
state to state, but it seems to have been particularly acute in Maryland at the time 
the Maryland legislation was passed. The drafters of the legislation warned that 
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that there is some kind of "crisis" in directors' liability, caused primarily 
by a judicial erosion of the business judgment rule and other legal limits 
on directorial liability, which led to a sharp decline in the availability and 
affordability of directors and officers (D&O) insurance. 
Much ink has been spilled on this question, 58 so it seems self-indul-
gent to spill more. A few observations are worth making, however, since 
they may cast some doubt on the reality of the "crisis." First, the recent 
trajectory of the business judgment rule has been in the ascendant, not 
the descendant. Although the "procedural precondition"59 required by 
Delaware and other jurisdictions appears to limit the rule, it in fact pro-
tects the rule. Once the board of directors establishes that it has ade-
quately informed itself of the merits of the decision at hand, the board 
may proceed to a decision with confidence that its decision will be shel-
tered from judicial scrutiny. Compliance with the procedural precondi-
tion is feasible, although it is time consuming, expensive and somewhat 
uncertain in its requirements. The specter of judicial second-guessing of 
the adequacy of the board's review procedures may be disquieting to in-
dividual directors, but it is a risk that can be handled by well-advised 
boards. The judicial camel's nose may be under the tent, but the rest of 
the beast is still outside. 60 In addition, the apparent tempering of the full 
rigor of the rule through attachment of a procedural precondition tends 
to deflate more radical challenges to the fairness of the rule. 
Second, those decisions sometimes cited as evidence of the erosion of 
the rule actually represent no such thing. In fact, these cases may simply 
be new examples of the courts' long-standing tendency to find breaches of 
the duty of care only when there is a duty of loyalty subtext or under-
tone. Even Van Gorkom, regarded by some as the most alarming of such 
decisions,61 is actually not so troubling when analyzed in those terms. 
For example, the Van Gorkom court may have suspected that the chief 
executive officer had rammed approval of the proposed acquisition 
failure to enact the legislation "is likely to result in ... the reincorporation of many 
Maryland corporations in other states, thus injuring the state's efforts to be per-
ceived as a favorable business climate .... " MARYLAND STATE BAR Ass'N, SEc. OF 
CORP., BANKING AND BUS. L., COMM. ON CORP. LAWS, SUBCOMM. ON DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY REP. 17 (Nov. 16, 1987), reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 254, 263 
(1989) [hereinafter DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT]. The sensitivity to the risk may 
be less in major jurisdictions such as California, Illinois or Michigan than in a 
smaller state such as Maryland with fewer corporate headquarters within its 
borders. 
58. See supra note 19. 
59. See supra text accompanying notes 39-42. 
60. This proposition is, of course, subject to debate. It can be argued that the court's 
willingness to scrutinize decisional procedures is an unjustifiable attempt to second-
guess highly complex, indeterminate decisions, and that the court's intrusion has 
generated a profound and disquieting sense of uncertainty. The prevalence of this 
sentiment among corporate managers and their counsel was surely germane to the 
proliferation of liability-limiting statutes. Whether their concern is overwrought or 
justifiable remains to be seen. 
61. See supra note 33. 
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through the board because he preferred a quick and lucrative sale of his 
own shares to a lengthier, more complex, and perhaps riskier manage-
ment-led leveraged buy-out that might have produced a better price for 
the other shareholders. 62 Furthermore, the entire board may have ap-
peared to the court to have been tainted by the CEO's conflict of interest. 
Recognition of the existence of this subtext in Van Gorkom does not re-
quire a concession that the case was correctly decided, or even a com-
plete recharacterization of Van Gorkom as a duty of loyalty case. 63 It 
merely suggests the possibility that the court's decision to hold the direc-
tors personally liable for breach of fiduciary obligation was influenced by 
a perception that more was at issue than gross negligence, and that the 
court's willingness to find a breach of the duty of care was determined 
not by a revolutionary change in attitude but by the faint aroma of 
disloyalty. 
Similarly, in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,64 Moran v. Household 
International, Inc. 65 and Rev/on, Inc. v. McAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 
Inc., 66 the Delaware courts' redefinition of the business judgment rule's 
applicability to target board defensive tactics does not represent a repudi-
ation of the traditional approach to the duty of care. The courts' require-
ment that the board prove that a proposed takeover constitutes a threat 
to the corporation and that the board's defensive tactics were a reason-
able response to that threat is merely a belated recognition of the inher-
ent conflict of interest imposed on directors by hostile takeover bids. 67 
The Delaware courts' willingness to modify the business judgment rule in 
that context is thus wholly appropriate, and does not undermine the ba-
sic function of the rule. It is worth noting, furthermore, that the Dela-
ware courts' refinement of the basic business judgment rule represents a 
cautious, conservative approach to the problems of defensive tactics that 
falls far short of more radical suggestions for restraining opportunistic 
behavior by target boards. 6 8 
62. This course of events is laid out in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 866-70 
(Del. 1985). 
63. Several different interpretations of Van Gorkom have surfaced. For a summary, see 
Special Project: Director and Officer Liability, Recent Developments Concerning the 
Duty of Care, the Duty of Loyalty and the Business Judgment Rule, 40 V AND. L. 
REV. 631, 638-44 (1987). 
64. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
65. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
66. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
67. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355-56; Rev/on, 506 A.2d at 180. 
For a detailed discussion and critique of these cases in light of this fundamental 
dilemma, seeR. GILSON & R. KRAAKMAN, 1988 SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW AND 
FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 155-97 (1988); Johnson & Siegel, Corpo-
rate Mergers, Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 332-
37 (1987). 
68. See, e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. 
REv. 1028 (1982) (generally supports a rule of passivity, but would allow target 
managers to seek out competing bidders); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and 
Sun~ Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982) (rejects argument that 
1989] Officer Liability Statute 293 
If in fact the current trend in the case law does not represent a sub-
stantial departure from the traditional approach to directorial liability 
for breach of the duty of care, then what accounts for the flood of law-
making? An easy way to answer this question is simply to point to the 
very real increase since 1986 in the cost of D & 0 insurance, a decrease 
in the availability of such insurance, and some degree of flight by direc-
tors and potential directors from the boards of public corporations. 69 
The new director and officer liability laws thus can be understood as an 
attempt to reduce insurers' risks and to lure them back into the business 
of providing relatively affordable D & 0 insurance. Alternatively, these 
statutes can be regarded as attempts to fill the gaps left by insurance that 
is either unavailable or prohibitively expensive. 
This answer is too easy, however, because it fails to account for the 
considerable uncertainty about whether directorial flight in response to 
insurance problems is really serious and widespread. Anecdotal evidence 
and some informal surveying exists, 70 but the comprehensive data is not 
really available. More importantly, this "explanation" does not explain 
why the cost of D & 0 insurance has risen so dramatically when the net 
effect of recent case law is a reaffirmation and reinforcement of the tradi-
tional approach to directorialliability.71 It has been argued that the in-
surance industry's behavior may have more to do with compensating for 
past failures in the marketing and pricing of D & 0 insurance than with 
any real perception of failure on the part of existing liability rules. 72 It 
also may be argued that the problem of directorial liability is simply part 
of a general crisis in liability insurance and presents no unique character-
istics. 73 Both of those arguments may be true, although th.e case has not 
target managers should be allowed to solicit competing bids); Easterbrook & Fis-
chel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) (proposing rule of passivity for target managers). 
69. For journalistic descriptions of this "crisis," see Baum, A Job Nobody Wants, Bus. 
WEEK, Sept. 9, 1986, at 56-61; Sellers, Too Many Hot Seats on the Boards, Washing-
ton Times (Insight), Feb. 2, 1987, at 40-41; The D&O Crisis: Corporate Boardroom 
Woes Grow, Nat'! L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 3; Hot Seats: Some Board Members 
Draw Fire, and Some Think Twice About Serving, Wall St. J., Feb. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 
6. [hereinafter Hot Seats]. For discussion of this "crisis" by some of the drafters of 
the Delaware statute, see Veasey, Finkelstein & Bigler, Responses to the D & 0 
Insurance Crisis, 19 REV. SEc. & COMM. REG. 263 (1986). For a parallel discussion 
by one of the drafters of the Maryland statute, see Hanks, supra note 4, at 1208-09. 
70. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 69, at 56-57 (listing the numbers of resignations since 
1984 from the boards of ten corporations); Hilder, Risky Business: Corporate Direc-
tors Bail Out, A.B.A. J., June 1986, at 24 (describing similar results of a study of 
board ·recruiting); Hot Seats, supra note 69, at 1. 
71. See supra text accompanying notes 57-68. 
72. For a critical discussion of the perception of "crisis," see Lee, supra note 19, at 252-
56. 
73. For discussion of this general crisis in liability insurance, see Abraham, Making 
Sense of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 399 (1987); Berger, The 
Impact of Tort Law Development on Insurance: The Availability/A.Ifordability Crisis 
and its Potential Solutions, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 285 (1988); Stewart, Crisis in Tort 
Law? The Institutional Perspective, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 184 (1987). 
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been proven for either of them. 74 
The real reason for the flood of liability-limiting statutes can be 
stated in a single word: uncertainty. It is easy to sit back with three or 
four years' worth of perspective on cases like Van Gorkom and conclude 
that after all is said and done, nothing has changed very much, and that 
directors still face very little risk of personal liability. It was quite an-
other matter, circa 1986, to have to write D & 0 insurance policies or to 
advise boards of directors in light of decisions that appeared to erode 
fundamental tenets and to increase the risk that duty of care claims 
would go to the jury. In other words, it may be correct to conclude that 
the legal significance of Van Gorkom and the other cases was less than 
first appeared, but that conclusion is almost irrelevant. The rapid, ad hoc 
judicial process by which the law moved from one point to another was 
the source of the problem because it led to the realization on the part of 
corporate counsel and insurance carriers that the courts could force fur-
ther changes if they so desired. The ancient monolith had developed a 
crack, and the future appeared very unpredictable indeed. The mere ap-
pearance of unpredictability may have been enough to discourage the D 
& 0 insurance carriers; 75 it was more than enough to spur to action the 
corporate. counsel who were to draft the new liability-limiting statutes. 76 
This general sense of uncertainty, furthermore, was compounded by 
the continuing volatility of the market for corporate control. The rapid 
proliferation of hostile control transactions in the last fifteen or twenty 
years77 has not only raised fundamental questions about the direction of 
the American economy, but has called into question our most basic as-
sumptions about corporate governance.78 The debate over these assump-
tions is not merely a matter of academic interest. It has a direct and 
sometimes daily impact on the lives of corporate managers, who are now 
74. For a critique of the "conspiracy theory" explanation of the general liability insur-
ance crisis, see Abraham, supra note 73, at 401-04. 
75. For discussion of the impact of legal unpredictability on the general liability insur-
ance crisis, see id. at 404-09. 
76. One of the drafters of the Maryland statute has stated that as a result of Van 
Gorkom and other cases, "the predictability on which directors and D & 0 insur-
ance carriers have for so long relied" has "evaporated." Hanks, supra note 4, at· 
1209. 
77. For an analysis of merger trends, see D. RAVENSCRAFT & F. SCHERER, MERGERS, 
SELL-OFFS & ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 20-55 (1987). 
78. This development has also infused new life into the study of corporate law. Twenty-
six years ago Bayless Manning described the state corporation statutes as "towering 
skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing nothing but 
wind," and concluded that "[t]hose of us in academic life who have specialized in 
corporate law face technological unemployment, or at least substantial retooling." 
Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 
YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962). In contrast to Manning's stark image and gloomy 
prediction, corporation law today is an extraordinarily vital area of inquiry. The 
combined impact of an explosive market for corporate control and the development 
of new analytical tools has forced rethinking of old shibboleths and given students of 
corporate law too much to do, rather than too little. 
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required to make extremely important and complex decisions about the 
futures of their corporations under circumstances that give them little 
time, almost no margin for error, and the certainty of being sued. 79 It is 
by no means surprising, therefore, that corporate directors and their at-
torneys have looked for some kind of additional help from the state legis-
latures, especially when decisions like Van Gorkom and the Delaware 
trilogy80 at least seemed to undermine traditional legal protections. 
Thus, it almost does not matter whether the courts really have com-
promised the business judgment rule. The feeling of vulnerability was 
enough to have provided the impetus for legislation. It is also enough, 
perhaps, to justify those aspects of the legislation that are intended to 
reinforce the traditional means of protecting directors from liability for 
breach of the duty of care. In particular, the Maryland legislation's au-
thorization of a limitation on directorial liability for breaches of the duty 
of care is an effective means of bolstering the state's traditional ap-
proach.81 The new statute helps ensure that the corporate law will per-
form its long-standing function of aligning the risk preferences of 
directors and shareholders of public corporations through reducing the 
risk of personal liability for negligence. The Maryland statute deserves at 
least two cheers for accomplishing that. Others aspects of this legisla-
tion, however, are more problematic. 
III. THE CONTINUING VALIDITY OF THE DISTINCTION 
BETWEEN THE DUTIES OF CARE AND LOYALTY AND 
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE MARYLAND 
STATUTE 
As explained above, section 1 02(b )(7) of the Delaware General Cor-
poration Law is similar to the Maryland statute insofar as they both use a 
charter-option approach that enables shareholders to approve charter 
provisions limiting the liability of the directors of the corporation. 82 
In other important res.pects, however, the two provisions differ 
substantially. 
The Maryland statute, for example, differs from the Delaware stat-
ute by permitting limitation of the liability of officers as well as direc-
tors. 83 Most significantly, however, the Maryland statute lacks the 
Delaware statute's broad prohibition of any limitation on liability "[f]or 
79. There is no small irony in the fact that the Trans Union directors rested their deci-
sion to accept the proposed acquisition in part on an attorney's advice that they 
might be sued if they rejected the proposal. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 
868 (Del. 1985). 
80. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text. 
81. The leading Maryland cases on the business judgment rule and the directors' stan-
dard of care are Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971); Parish v. 
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968); Moun-
tain Manor Realty, Inc. v. Buccheri, 55 Md. App. 185, 461 A.2d 45 (1983). 
82. See supra text accompanying notes 15-18. 
83. MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a) (Supp. 1988). 
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any breach of the director's duty of loyalty to the corporation .... " 84 
Maryland section 2-405.2(a)(l)-(2) merely prohibits liability limitations: 
(1) To the extent that it is proved that the person actually 
received an improper benefit or profit in money, property, or 
services, for the amount of the benefit or profit in money, prop-
erty, or services actually received; 
(2) To the extent that a judgment or other final adjudication 
adverse to the person is entered in a proceeding based on a find-
ing in the proceeding that the person's action, or failure to act, 
was the result of active and deliberate dishonesty and was mate-
rial to the cause of action adjudicated in the proceeding .... 85 
Although there may be some debate about the precise scope of these ex-
clusions, they are obviously much narrower than Delaware's broad ex-
clusion of breaches of the duty of loyalty from the benefit of a cap on 
liability. 
The significance of this difference between the Maryland and Dela-
ware statutes should not be underestimated. The drafters of the Mary-
land provision obviously intended to reduce the risk of liability from a 
wider range of managerial misbehavior than was covered by the Dela-
ware statute. More specifically, the rejection of a general reference to the 
duty of loyalty, in favor of a specific and exclusive reference to two of the 
most egregious means of breaching that duty, substantially reduced the 
possibility that ingenious counsel and compliant judges might succeed in 
recharacterizing care claims as loyalty claims in order to circumvent the 
liability cap. 86 The Maryland statute reflects the conclusion that the goal 
of protecting managers from substantial risks of personal liability would 
be seriously undermined by a broad distinction between the duties of care 
and loyalty. Even more fundamentally, it seems to embody a belief that 
there is no meaningful difference between the two duties. Any attempt to 
compare the merits of the Delaware and Maryland statutes, therefore, 
should begin with an analysis of the distinction between those two duties. 
Perhaps the sharpest critics of the traditional distinction between 
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(1) (Supp. 1988). 
85. Mo. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN.§ 2-405.2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1988). For references 
to other state statutes omitting a broad duty of loyalty exception, see Hanks, supra 
note 4, at 1213-15. 
86. One of the drafters of the Maryland statute has expressly stated this concern. After 
critically describing the Delaware statute's duty of loyalty exclusion, Hanks pre-
dicted that "[i]t will not be surprising ... if stockholders of Delaware corporations 
that have adopted exculpatory charter provisions begin alleging violations of the 
duty of loyalty for acts or omissions that until now would have supported a claim 
for breach of the duty of care." Hanks, supra note 4, at 1212. This is not a trivial 
concern. If this article's analysis of the duty of loyalty undertones in Van Gorkom is 
correct, then the distinction between the two duties may be so elusive that it justifies 
the Maryland statute's different approach. See supra text accompanying notes 61-
63. It will be argued below, however, that the distinction between the two duties is 
real and useful, and that there are disadvantages to abandoning the broad distinc-
tion between the two. See infra text accompanying notes 89-103. 
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the duties of care and loyalty are Professors Fischel and Bradley. They 
have argued that: 
[T]he distinction between the duty of care and the duty of loy-
alty is not at all clear. For example, there is no difference be-
tween working less hard than promised at a given level of 
compensation (a breach of the duty of care) and being compen-
sated more than promised at a given level of work (a breach of 
the duty of loyalty). Both are examples of agency costs (con-
flicts of interest in an economic sense) that reduce shareholders' 
wealth.87 
This position has the charm of any counterintuitive assault on the 
conventional wisdom. It also has a sound basis in economic theory, inso-
far as both types of violation do represent agency costs - decisions by 
the managers to maximize their own utility rather than that of the share-
holders. 88 Fischel and Bradley's position also demonstrates the concep-
tual weakness of the legal distinction between care and loyalty as applied 
to the problem of shirking. Acceptance of their position, furthermore, 
would appear to lead almost inescapably to the conclusion that any limi-
tations on liability should extend to loyalty as well as care violations. 
Their position thus has great conceptual force, since it links care and 
loyalty violations under the common rubric of agency costs and asks why 
there should be two different sets of liability rules for what is essentially 
the same problem. There are several answers to that question and they 
suggest that the conventional wisdom may be more resilient than Fischel 
and Bradley would concede. 
First, some deference should be given to the fact that for a very long 
time the courts have found the care/loyalty distinction a useful means of 
determining when they should intervene in private economic decision-
making and when they should not. Fischel and Bradley's analysis of the 
ambiguous boundary situation of shirking suggests that this distinction is 
not absolutely coherent, but it has at least seemed to many decision-mak-
ers to be a relatively principled means of sorting out difficult cases. 89 Of 
87. Fischel & Bradley, supra note 47, at 291; see also Edited Transcript of Proceedings of 
the Business Roundtable/Emory University Law and Economics Center Conference 
on Remedies Under the ALI Proposals: Law and Economics, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 
357, 368-69, 371 (1986) (comments of Fischel) [hereinafter Proceedings]. Other 
commentators have made the same argument. See, e.g., Honabach, All That Glit-
ters, supra note 2, at 475 ("As the contract theory makes clear, there is little or no 
difference between many allegations of a failure to exercise due care and allegations 
of self-dealing."). 
88. For a fundamental discussion of the problem of agency costs in business organiza-
tions, see Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305 (1976). For very useful illustra-
tions of how these costs arise and how they may be handled, see W. KLEIN & J. 
COFFEE, supra note 31, at 8-42. 
89. Goetz has made a similar point about the usefulness of the care/loyalty distinction 
for the planning function. Goetz, A Verdict on Corporate Liability Rules and the 
Derivative Suit: Not Proven, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 344, 350 (1986) ("The legal sys-
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course, it may be argued that these decision-makers were simply wrong, 
but that point remains to be proven. There is something to be said for so 
functional a legal distinction, and it should not be junked lightly. 
Second, the law's function of setting normative standards of behav-
ior may be undermined by a refusal to distinguish between care and loy-
alty for purposes of liability. The argument made above that the duty of 
care should be largely aspirational in character seems to go against the 
grain, despite the very good arguments in favor of such a position.90 The 
rhetoric of care is simply less persuasive when it is not attached to a risk 
of liability. It may make sense to accept that consequence, as this article 
has argued, but the law should be cautious in pushing much farther. In 
particular, any characterization of the duty of loyalty as largely aspira-
tional cuts even more violently against the grain, despite the conceptual 
similarity of the two duties. Collapsing the distinction between the duty 
of care and loyalty and creating a common set of liability rules that ren-
ders both duties essentially hortatory may go too far in diminishing the 
law's function of setting and reinforcing norms of behavior through the 
combined effects of exhortation and liability.91 
Finally, Fischel and Bradley's argument that the same liability rules 
should apply to care and loyalty violations ignores the possibility that 
markets and courts may operate more effectively with respect to one vio-
lation than to the other. For example, the courts' traditional reluctance 
to second-guess business decisions does not leave shareholders to the 
mercies of negligent or incompetent managers. At least in public corpo-
rations, the markets for managerial services and the market for corporate 
control monitor managerial performance and impose their own sanc-
tions.92· Judicial monitoring by means of derivative suits probably does 
not work as well. With respect to duty of loyalty violations, however, 
judicial monitoring is both more effective and more needed. It is more 
effective because courts are more likely to be comfortable with the fair-
ness or honesty considerations central to loyalty cases than with the busi-
ness or investment considerations essential to duty of care cases.93 It is 
tern should be applauded for carving out common understandings about principles 
of distinction that could help parties articulate their relationships."); see also Pro-
ceedings, supra note 87, at 369 (comments of Goetz). 
90. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55. 
91. See supra notes 29, 43. 
92. The basic works on the monitoring functions of markets are Fama, Agency Problems 
and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. PoL EcoN. 288 (1980); Fama & Jensen, Separa-
tion of Ownership and Control, 26 J. L. & EcoN. 301 (1983). For a critical analysis 
of the role of market monitoring in corporate governance, see Fox, The Role of the 
Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis: A Comment on Weiss and White, 76 Ca-
lif. L. Rev. 1015, 1038-44 (1988). See also infra note 99. 
93. Scott argues that courts are more comfortable with close scrutiny of loyalty claims 
because "[t]he analysis is far more simple and reliable than in a duty of care case 
where the court must assess the interaction of a multitude of factors in a business 
disaster." Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy Analysis in Law: A Response 
to Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299, 308 (1986). 
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more needed because loyalty cases, as Professor Scott has pointed out, 
often involve concealment of the crucial facts. 94 Market monitoring does 
not work as effectively in such contexts, and the facts will be ferreted out 
only if shareholders - or their attorneys - have an incentive to look for 
them. Liability rules that permit a higher level of judicial scrutiny and a 
greater likelihood of managerial liability provide such an incentive. In 
short, reliance on market monitoring may make sense with respect to the 
duty of care; reliance on judicial intervention may do so with respect to 
the duty of loyalty. 
Insofar as the Maryland statute tends to collapse the distinction be-
tween the duties of care and loyalty for purposes of liability, it adopts a 
misguided and potentially harmful position. This is the net result of de-
viating from the Delaware statute's broad exception for breaches of the 
duty of loyalty. Maryland's carve-outs from coverage of the liability cap 
would seem to apply only to the most blatant forms of loyalty violations: 
embezzlement, graft, egregious self-dealing and one-shot frauds. They 
would not appear to apply to the subtler questions created by corporate 
opportunity cases,95 cases involving breaches of the duty of impartial 
treatment of different classes of shareholders96 or to cases involving cor-
94. /d. One of the reporters for the ALI project reiterated this point in rejecting Fischel 
and Bradley's attempt to collapse the care/loyalty distinction. Referring to Fischel 
and Bradley's discussion of the boundary situation of shirking, the reporter stated: 
Even if a legal deterrent were lacking, market and social forces seem more 
likely to be able to deal with the official who is merely lazy than with the 
one who is dishonest or self-regarding. In contrast, it cannot be assumed 
that market forces are adequate to penalize duty of loyalty violations, par-
ticularly when opportunities for large 'one shot' gains arise. 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 2, § 7.16, at 220-21. 
95. For example, does the usurpation of a corporate opportunity necessarily mean that 
a director or officer has "actually received an improper benefit or profit in money, 
property or services," or that his act was the result of "active and deliberate dishon-
esty"? See MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS CODE ANN. § 2-405.2(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 1988). 
Does the benefit derived from the opportunity itself constitute the requisite "im-
proper benefit"? For an example of an application of the corporate opportunity 
doctrine under Maryland law, see Maryland Metals v. Metzner, 282 Md. 31, 382 
A.2d 564 (1978) .. What about corporate opportunity problems created by interlock-
ing directorates in parent-subsidiary relationships? Does the misallocation of corpo-
rate opportunities as a means of freezing out minority shareholders of the subsidiary 
corporation constitute an "improper benefit" to the directors of the subsidiary? The 
leading case on this general problem is Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 
(Del. 1971 ). 
The report of the Maryland State Bar Association Committee that drafted the 
legislation explains that the "improper benefit" concept was "limit(ed] to ... bene-
fits actually received in the form of money, property or services in order to eliminate 
any argument that such ambiguous items as business goodwill or social ingratiation 
may constitute a benefit to a director or officer." DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, 
supra note 57, at 18, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 263. It is by no means 
clear why such "ambiguous items" should be eliminated from the concept of "im-
proper benefit," because they might be quite valuable to the recipient. It is also not 
clear what other "ambiguous items" are eliminated by the narrow phrasing of the 
statute. 
96. For examples of allegations of breach of the duty of impartiality, see Speed v. Trans-
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porate control transactions in which some kind of conflict of interest is 
alleged. 97 If it is argued that the Maryland statute's carve-outs do apply 
to such violations, then it must be asked why the drafters chose to state 
narrow exceptions to the coverage of the liability limitation rather than 
to use Delaware's broad exclusion. 98 
The drafters' decision thus diminishes the value of the traditional 
distinction between care and loyalty, undermines the normative function 
of the corporate law, and disrupts a rational allocation of monitoring 
responsibilities between courts and markets. The Delaware approach to 
coverage of the liability limitation is thus preferable. 99 
america Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 
36 (3d Cir. 194 7). This duty may be asserted more frequently in control transac-
tions as a result of Delaware's adoption of broad duty of loyalty exclusions. For an 
example of the Delaware courts' analysis of this issue, see Jedwab v. MGM Grand 
Hotels, 509 A.2d 584, 591 (Del. Ch. 1986) (claim that it was a breach of the duty of 
loyalty for directors in a control transaction to "unfairly favor one class of stock 
over another"). 
97. The line between the duties of care and loyalty in control transactions, and particu-
larly in hostile takeovers, needs sharper definition in light of the target manage-
ment's inherent conflict of interest. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986), the court described the same conduct as 
violating the duty of loyalty in one part of the opinion and violating the duty of care 
in another. /d. at 182, 185 (describing an auction-ending lock-up option first as 
violation of the duty of loyalty and then as a violation of the duty of care). 
98. Perhaps the best explanation of the Maryland approach to this question is that the 
statute attempts to replicate the protection that would be provided by a D & 0 
liability insurance policy, which is now theoretically unavailable or too costly. As 
the drafters explained, "[t]he exception for 'active and deliberate dishonesty' is 
based upon a similar exclusion appearing in virtually every directors and officers 
liability insurance policy .... " DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 57, at 
18, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REv. at 263. 
99. Butler and Ribstein have argued that it is irrelevant whether the care/loyalty dis-
tinction is meaningful (which they doubt), because shareholders should be free to 
contract around loyalty obligations as well as care obligations. The only problem 
with the Maryland statute, they conclude, is not that it abandons this distinction, 
but that it does not go far enough in facilitating shareholder choice. Butler & Rib-
stein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the New Mary-
land Officer-Director Liability Provision, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 352, 360-64 (1989). 
They argue further that a "limitation on the shareholders' power to contract can be 
logically justified only by imperfections in the market's ability to constrain ineffi-
cient contract terms. The efficiency of the securities markets makes any such justifi-
cation quite doubtful in this context." /d. at 362. Butler's and Ribstein's faith in 
the efficient capital market hypothesis is not entirely misplaced, but they are far too 
sanguine about its implications for legal policy. There is an active debate over 
whether the market's efficiency is so complete as to justify the wholesale repudiation 
of traditional legal restraints on private bargaining. See, e.g., Coffee, Market Failure 
and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717, 719 
n.lO (1984) ("[D]istinctions should be drawn in terms of the degree to which the 
[Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis] is used as a justification for deregulation -
particularly since very little evidence exists with respect to any market other than 
the New York Stock Exchange."); Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly 
Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 796-837 (1985) ("In 
our world, which may be only 'close' to the best of all possible worlds, the insights 
provided by theories of financial markets require patient cultivation before legal pol-
icy flowers.:'); Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market is Not Efficient, 19 
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The Delaware approach, however, is not without its costs, as the 
drafters of the Maryland statute undoubtedly realized. 100 As explained 
above, a broad exception for duty of loyalty cases will undoubtedly lead 
to attempts to recharacterize care claims as loyalty claims. 101 This is 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341, 394-402 (1986) ("Many legal commentators have as-
sumed that the stock market is efficient. These commentators should recognize that 
the validity of this hypothesis is questionable."); Burgman & Cox, Corporate Direc-
tors, Corporate Realities, and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union 
Case, 11 J. Corp. L. 311, 354-69 (1986) (critique of the neoclassical model's claims 
of the adequacy of market mechanisms). 
The possibility that there are in fact "imperfections in the market's ability to 
constrain inefficient contract terms," to use Butler and Ribstein's language, thus 
requires some qualification of any assumption that shareholder choice should be 
given free rein, with mandatory rules entirely (or largely) eschewed. The possibility 
should also cast some doubt upon the assumption that shareholders should be per-
mitted to opt out of liability for breach of the duty of loyalty. Butler and Ribstein 
apparently reject the notion that this uncertainty over the relative efficiency of the 
market would require any qualification of their conclusions, but it should at least be 
recognized that the matter is highly debatable. Given the uncertainty, changes in 
legal policy dependent upon a faith in market efficiency should be cautious and 
incremental. Permitting shareholders to opt out of loyalty obligations cannot be 
characterized as a modest change, but attempting to reinforce the traditional ap-
proach to liability for breach of the duty of care can. Preservation of the traditional 
distinction between loyalty and care thus seems to be the correct approach. 
Furthermore, Butler and Ribstein's highly optimistic assessment of the value of 
facilitating shareholder choice should be read in light of the ongoing debate over the 
nature and extent of the constraints upon shareholder choice as a value-maximizing 
ordering mechanism. See, e.g., Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock 
and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 39-60 (1988) (discus-
sion of the collective action and strategic choice problems in dual class recapitaliza-
tions); see also Coffee, No Exit? Opting Out, The Contractual Theory of the 
Corporation, and the Special Case of Remedies, 53 BROOKLYN L. REV. 919 (1988). 
With respect to the meaningfulness of the underlying distinction between the 
duties of care and loyalty, Butler and Ribstein reiterate the analysis put forward by 
Fischel & Bradley, supra note 47. Butler & Ribstein, supra, at 361-62. This analysis 
is at least subject to the criticisms outlined above. See supra text accompanying 
notes 89-94. It is also subject to those suggested by Goetz and Scott, and by the 
Reporter for the ALI Corporate Governance Project. See Goetz, supra note 89, at 
350; Scott, supra note 93, at 308; ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 
2, at 220-21. For a perceptive discussion of these issues that criticizes some of the 
more extreme manifestations of contractarian ideology, see Branson, Assault on An-
other Citadel: Attempts to Curtail the Fiduciary Standard of Loyalty Applicable to 
Corporate Directors, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 375, 394-400 (1988). Branson is particu-
larly disturbed by the use of contractarian arguments to justify liability-limiting 
statutes whose opt-out provisions will tend to erode the duty of loyalty. He con-
cludes that a "relatively stringent and rigid common law duty of loyalty should be 
maintained as the bedrock beneath and the brackets around the movement toward 
private ordering in the affairs of American business corporations." Id. at 402. 
100. See Hanks, supra note 4, at 1212-13. 
101. See supra text accompanying note 86. Some also may be troubled by the fact that 
the Delaware corporation statute does not use the term "duty of loyalty" at any 
point. The lack of any specific statutory reference to such a crucial term might 
exacerbate the risk that the liability limitation will be undermined by a judicial con-
ftation of "care" and "loyalty." The lack of a statutory reference of the duty of 
loyalty, however, is probably immaterial, because the courts would have to work out 
the meaning of the term and its relation to the duty of care in any event. 
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particularly true in the context of control transactions where the omni-
present taint of managerial conflict of interest obscures the line between 
care and loyalty. The Delaware statute may eventually produce a more 
encompassing judicial definition of the duty of loyalty and its attendant 
liabilities than is known today. This possibility must have been quite 
troublesome to the drafters of the Maryland statute, since the fear of 
liability arising from control transactions was undoubtedly one of the 
primary motivations for enacting this type of legislation. 102 
The possibility that all this might happen, however, does not dimin-
ish the validity of the Delaware approach. The ultimate result of such 
redirected litigation would be closer attention to, and more sophisticated 
analysis of, the distinction between these two fundamental aspects of fi-
duciary duty. Furthermore, a heightened tendency to analyze manage-
rial behavior in control transactions in loyalty terms would arguably be 
more appropriate than the current tendency to analyze that behavior 
under a modified version of the business judgment rule. 103 The Delaware 
approach may perpetuate some of the uncertainty about managerial lia-
bility that has helped generate the current "crisis," but the degree of that 
uncertainty is not clear, and the costs of abandoning the traditional dis-
tinction reflected in the Delaware statute are. 
IV. OF OFFICERS AND CLOSE CORPORATIONS 
Part III has argued that a weakness in the Maryland statute is its 
treatment of liability for breach of the ·duty of loyalty. Other aspects of 
the statute are also questionable, although ultimately not as troubling as 
the statute's treatment of the duty of loyalty. 
A. Should Officers Have the Benefit of a.Liability-Limiting Charter 
Provision? 
As explained above, the Maryland statute differs from its Delaware 
counterpart by permitting shareholders to limit the liability of officers as 
well as directors. 104 Is this a distinction without an important difference, 
or is it an unwarranted extension of liability limitations? 
This question is difficult to answer because rela,tively little attention 
has been paid to the differences between the fiduciary duties of directors 
and officers. More attention has been paid to differences in the obliga-
tions of inside and outside directors. 105 Those cases that have addressed 
the question have tended to content themselves with observing that the 
officers' higher degree of involvement in the business requires holding 
102. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 57, at 5, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REv. at 256. 
103. For critiques of that approach, see R. GILSON & R. KRAAKMAN, supra note 67, at 
155-97; Johnson & Siegel, supra note 67, at 332-37. 
104. See supra text accompanying notes 16-18. 
105. See Special Project, supra note 34, at 620. 
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them to a higher degree of care. 106 A possible analogue is the securities 
law principle that some officers, by virtue of their position, must show a 
higher degree of due diligence in order to escape liability under section 
11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 107 This merely suggests, however, that 
persons with a higher degree of involvement and control - whether they 
be officers or inside directors - may be subjected to some heightened 
scrutiny when breaches of the duty of care are alleged. 108 
Another possible distinction may flow from the difference in officers' 
arid directors' functions. It is by now commonplace to say that the 
board's primary function is that of ~onitoring management. 109 A breach 
of the directors' duty of care is perhaps most likely .to arise when the 
board somehow fails to meet its responsibility to monitor the officers' 
behavior. 110 This distinction simply establishes, however,· that officers 
and directors have to do different things in order to satisfy their fiduciary 
duty. It does not suggest that there is some fundamental difference in the 
nature of that duty, or that a limitation on liability is appropriate for one 
group but not the other. 
To determine whether a limitation on liability is appropriate for of-
ficers, it is necessary to reexamine the reasons why such a limitation is 
appropriate for directors, particularly outside directors. At first glance, 
at least one of the justifications for a liability-limiting rule does not seem 
to apply to officers. The directors' inherent informational disadvantages, 
which limit their ability to make decisions in a manner that a more rigor-
ous application of the standard of care might require, result largely from 
the officers' control over the flow of information generated by the corpo-
ration. 111 Officers, of course, do not suffer from such informational dis-
advantages. This rationale for a liability-limiting rule thus does not 
apply to them. 
On the other hand, the other rationales do apply. The discussion 
above of the role of liability-limiting rules in aligning the risk preferences 
of directors and shareholders 112 is equally applicable to officers. In fact, 
it makes more sense to talk about aligning the risk preferences of manag-
ers and shareholders, regardless of whether the managers are officers or 
directors. It also makes sense to align the fates of directors and o~cers 
106. See id. at 619 n.85. 
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1981). The leading case under section ll is Escott v. Barchris 
Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For discussion of the differ-
ing due diligence obligations of the different classes of section ll defendants, see M. 
STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 323-410 (1986); R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, 
SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 931-34 (6th ed. 1987). 
108. See Special Project, supra note 34, at 619. · 
109. SeeR. CLARK, supra note 31, at 129-36; M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
CORPORATION, A LEGAL ANALYSIS 156-70 (1976). For an explanation of the cir-
cumstances that relegate the boards of public corporations to this function, see 
Manning, supra note 53, at 1481-92. 
110. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra note 31, at 149. 
Ill. See supra text accompanying notes 53-54. 
112. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52. 
304 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 18 
for purposes of liability, since they are equally subject to the disciplinary 
effect of market mechanisms. 113 To the extent that those mechanisms 
render negligence-based liability rules superfluous with respect to direc-
tors, they also do so with respect to officers. In addition, officers, like 
directors, lack the ability to diversify the risk of negligence liability since 
their human capital is even more clearly invested in a one-asset portfo-
lio.114 They are thus also relatively inefficient cost-avoiders. 
On balance, therefore, the Maryland statute's extension of its au-
thorized liability limitations to officers and directors is justifiable. It also 
eliminates a disturbing anomaly. A statute that applies only to directors 
creates the possibility that directors who are also officers may face per-
sonal liability for their actions as officers, but not as directors. 115 This 
would mean that only outside directors, as a practical matter, would ben-
efit from the statutory limitation on liability. If the sole purpose of the 
statute were to stanch the outflow of outside directors from corporate 
boards, this difference in treatment would be justifiable. 116 This article 
has argued, however, that there are other more fundamental justifications 
for liability limitations, at least with respect to the duty of care. In addi-
tion, a statute that does not extend protection to officers may pose intrac-
table problems for courts called upon to distinguish acts done in official 
capacities from those done in directorial capacities. The net result might 
be that only outside directors would have the benefit of the liability limi-
tation. This result seems inconsistent with the goals of liability-limiting 
legislation, and is best avoided through a statutory solution like 
Maryland's. 
B. Liability Rules and Liability Limits in Close Corporations 
This article has argued not only that a limitation on directors' and 
officers' liability for breach of the duty of care (although not the duty of 
loyalty) is not dangerous to shareholders of public corporations, but also 
that it is a useful means of aligning the interests of managers and share-
holders.117 This argument leads to the conclusion that some reduction of 
the role of liability rules in the governance of public corporations is justi-
fiable. This conclusion ultimately depends on certain basic assumptions 
about the division of functions within public corporations, the need to 
113. See supra note 92. 
114. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49. 
115. See Honabach, All That Glitters, supra note 2, at 470-71 (treating Van Gorkom as 
applying only to officers). 
116. See supra text accompanying note 69. While this may not be the sole purpose of the 
Maryland statute, it surely was a purpose and one that can be applauded. Outside 
directors have become a crucial part of corporate governance, and their continued 
involvement should be encouraged. The drafters of the Maryland statute, further-
more, clearly intended the statute to address the problem of flight by outside direc-
tors. See DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 57, at 7, reprinted in 18 U. 
BAL T. L. REv. at 257 (decrying the loss of outside directors as a result of the liabil-
ity crisis). 
117. See supra text accompanying notes 45-55. 
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align shareholders' and managers' risk preferences, and the relative effi-
ciency of market monitoring mechanisms as means of controlling some 
agency costs. 118 
Can the same conclusion be reached when the nature of the corpo-
rate organization is different? In a close corporation, the economic func-
tions of managers and shareholders typically are not separate, since the 
managers are usually the largest residual claimants. 119 Accordingly, 
there is less need to monitor the managers' performance, since managers 
and shareholders tend to be the same people. This is fortunate, because 
markets cannot serve as monitoring mechanisms when there is no public 
market for the close corporation's securities and when the corporation's 
managers do not compete in either intra-firm or external markets for 
managerial services. 120 The central dilemma of close corporation gov-
ernance thus is not how to monitor managers' performance of their spe-
cialized economic functions, but how to constrain opportunistic behavior 
by manager/shareholders who use majority positions to appropriate dis-
proportionate shares of the corporation's income. 121 The dilemma of 
minority shareholders faced with such opportunistic behavior is exacer-
bated by the lack of any meaningful market exit from the relationship. 122 
The mere existence of these substantial differences suggests that one 
cannot simply assume that conclusions about the desirability of liability-
limiting provisions apply with equal strength to public and close corpora-
tions. On the other hand, one also cannot assume that such provisions 
would be useless or dangerous in the close corporation context. Their 
function may simply be different. 
The difference in function may derive from the differing roles of lia-
bility rules in each context. In public corporations, liability rules may be 
useful as monitoring mechanisms that help control the agency costs gen-
erated by the specialization of functions. The only question is whether 
they are effective monitoring mechanisms with respect to all types of 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 45-81. 
119. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 50, at 273. The gross distinc-
tion between "public" and "close" corporations is used with full awareness that the 
dichotomy between the two tends to be overstated, and that there are many hybrids 
that share characteristics of both ideal types. See W. KLEIN & J. COFFEE, supra 
note 31, at 107 ("Most corporations are neither public, in the way General Motors 
is, nor closely held, as a family corporation is."). The distinction still does have 
some explanatory power, however, as it reflects a perhaps more fundamental dis-
tinction between "owner controlled" and "manager controlled" firms. See id. Em-
phasizing the distinction between owner control and manager control reinforces the 
need to reexamine the role of liability rules and liability limits in the two types of 
organizations. For discussion of the effects of liability limits in hybrid forms, see 
Honabach, All That Glitters, supra note 2, at 438 n.18; Honabach, Consent and Exit, 
supra note 14, at 342 & n.170. 
120. For discussion of these markets as monitoring mechanisms, see the authorities cited 
supra note 92. 
121. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note 50, at 278-79. 
122. For discussion of the "exit" problems of shareholders in close corporations, see 
Honabach, Consent and Exit, supra note 14, at 344. 
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agency cost. As argued above, it may be that they perform that function 
well with respect to duty of loyalty problems but not duty of care 
problems. 123 A statutory provision limiting liabilities for breach of the 
duty of care, but not the duty of loyalty, thus makes sense for public 
corporations. 
In close corporations, the lack of specialization and the intermin-
gling of economic functions mitigate monitoring problems, but increase 
the risk of opportunistic behavior. Liability rules with respect to the 
duty of care thus do not really perform a monitoring function in close 
corporations. The real problem in close corporations is typically one of 
loyalty, arising when one group of shareholders decides to oppress the 
other. Whether one defines the focus of loyalty as the corporation or the 
other shareholders, 124 liability rules applicable to loyalty violations may 
play some role in constraining such behavior. 
A provision that would limit the liability of managers of close corpo-
rations for breach of the duty of care is thus largely innocuous, not be-
cause it serves the shareholders' interests, but because it would be mostly 
irrelevant to those shareholders' real concerns. They are by-and-large 
not preoccupied with monitoring shirking or negligence on the part of 
managers, but with freeze-outs or deadlocks engineered by overreaching 
majorities. 125 Eliminating liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty, 
123. See supra text accompanying notes 45-81. 
124. The leading case characterizing shareholders as fiduciaries of each other is Donahue 
v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 585-97, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512-18 (1975). 
This analysis largely depended on an analogy· of shareholders in close corporations 
to partners. /d. at 5116-87, 328 N.E.2d at 512-13. The analogy has been criticized as 
not representing the parties' real intentions and as reflecting a misunderstanding of 
the different forms of business organization. Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corpora-
tions, supra note 50, at 297-300 ("[T]he assumption that participants in closely held 
corporations want to be governed by partnership law is itself questionable."); Hill-
man, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration 
of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. 
REv. 1, 87 (1982) ("There are also structural differences between the two forms of 
organization which make a close corporation something more than a partnership in 
a corporate shell."). 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has acknowledged that majority sharehold-
ers in some circumstances owe a fiduciary obligation to minority shareholders, but 
has expressed some skepticism about Donahue's analogy of close corporations to 
partnerships. See Toner v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 304 Md. 256, 267, 278-80, 498 
A.2d 642, 647, 653-54 (1985). 
125. This is not to suggest that 'there are no duty-of-care problems in close corporations. 
There is in fact a subgenre of care problems almost peculiar to close corporations -
that of the totally inattentive director, who may be a spouse or relative serving as an 
accommodation to a principal shareholder. The classic case in this line is Francis v. 
United Jersey Bank, 8'7 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981). See supra note 31; see also 
Minton v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 580, 364 P.2d 473, 475, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 643 
(1961) (immaterial for liability purposes that director accepted office as an "accom-
modation"). Duty-of-care case~ in close corporations, however, tend to be less fre-
quent than the great number of cases involving freeze-outs and other forms of 
opportunistic behavior. Thus while the duty of care plays an important exhortative 
function in close corporations as well as public corporations, it is a relatively unim-
portant source of litigation. In contrast, the loyalty problems generated by freeze-
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however, may remove one of the few available constraints on such behav-
ior, and thus may be undesirable. Consequently, the Maryland statute's 
failure to include a broad duty of loyalty exclusion may be more prob-
lematic in the close corporate context than in the context of public 
corporations. 
Before settling for that conclusion, however, one should take into 
account the charter-option aspect of the Maryland statute. This article 
has not yet addressed that issue, because with respect to public corpora-
tions the existence of the option is largely meaningless. 126 Information, 
coordination and free-riding problems make it virtually impossible for 
shareholders to resist management requests for liability-limiting charter 
amendments. 127 The transactional costs of resistance are simply too 
high. As far as shareholders of public corporations are concerned, the 
statute might as well be mandatory in operation. 128 
In close corporations, however, the existence of an option may be 
significant. Shareholders in such corporations are likely to be able to 
negotiate agreements that reflect the desired allocation of control, risk 
and return. 129 Real bargaining is at least possible when the number of 
shareholders are few and each is able to reap the benefits of his or her 
own participation in the bargaining process. 
The agreements among those participating in the bargaining may 
take several forms. There are, for example, highly specific agreements 
such as employment contracts, buy-sell agreements triggered by death or 
retirement, or restrictions on transferability of the shares that define with 
outs are a matter of great concern. For discussion of these problems, see Hethering-
ton & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the 
Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1 (1977); Hillman, supra 
note 124. 
126. For a thorough critique of a claim by the drafters of the Maryland statute that the 
charter-option provision "enhances the role of stockholders in corporate govern-
ance." DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 57, at 21, reprinted in 18 U. 
BALT. L. REV. at 265; see Honabach, Consent and Exit, supra note 14, at 324-331. 
127. For a reference to the "hundreds" of other corporations already incorporated in 
Delaware that have amended or proposed charter amendments adding exculpatory 
provisions, see Hanks, supra note 4, at 1216 n.32. Such charter amendments are so 
routinely approved that the New York Stock Exchange has adopted an informal 
position allowing brokers to act without instruction from the shareholders in voting 
proxies in favor of such amendments; so long as there is no litigation pending 
against the directors. Telephone conversation with Nora Sisk, New York Stock Ex-
change (December 6, 1988). 
128. The liability legislation proposed in 1987 was intended to be mandatory in operation 
and not a charter option. See supra note 9; DIRECTOR LIABILITY REPORT, supra 
note 57, at 2, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. REV. at 254. The charter-option feature 
may have been added in 1988 to make the new bill more palatable to the legislature. 
The distinction certainly received great emphasis from the drafters. See DIRECTOR 
LIABILITY REPORT, supra note 57, at 2, 11, 16, 21, reprinted in 18 U. BALT. L. 
REV. at 254, 259, 262, 265. 
129. For further discussion of these issues, see Honabach, Consent and Exit, supra note 
14, at 344-46. This discussion of the use of exculpatory provisions in close corpora-
tions benefited particularly from the comments and suggestions of Cyril Moscow. 
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precision the central elements of the parties' relationship. Because the 
cost of writing such agreements precludes complete specificity, the par-
ties usually agree to be bound by at least some of the provisions of the 
applicable state corporation statute. For instance, the parties may, in 
effect, agree to rely on statutorily-created fiduciary duties as an implied 
standard term of their contract in lieu of specifying in greater detail the 
exact nature of each other's obligations. Their ability to rely on such 
"off-the-rack" rules allows them to reduce the transactional costs of de-
fining their relationship. 
A statutory provision that permits shareholders to choose the extent 
to which fiduciary obligations can be enforced through suits for liability 
simply gives the parties another option. The parties thus can choose to 
either: (i) write highly specific contracts defining in detail all of the par-
ties' obligations and the sanctions for violating them; (ii) minimize con-
tract-writing and rely on statutory fiduciary obligations and liability rules 
as implied standard terms; or (iii) adopt an intermediate position that 
implicitly relies on fiduciary obligations but not on liability rules for en-
forcing them. If shareholders in close corporations are in fact able to 
bargain effectively over these options, then there is no reason not to allow 
them the third option, even if that would permit them to impose limita-
tions on liability for breach of the duty of loyalty. Evaluation of the 
parties' ability to bargain effectively, however, should give due weight to 
the great problem of transition in ownership in close corporations. The, 
initial period of bargaining among the founders of the business may re-
flect relatively equal amounts of information, economic leverage and so-
phistication, and hence may be a context in which the adoption of broad 
exculpatory provisions is appropriate. The net effect of such provisions 
on the founders while they are still involved in the business may be mini-
mal. When stock ownership has passed to a spouse or other heirs, how-
ever, liability-limiting provisions may exacerbate the risk of deadlock or 
freeze-out. This kind of risk can be reduced through careful planning for 
such transitional situations, but the availability of the charter-option may 
lead to the routine use of liability limitations in situations where they are 
not appropriate. 
Much depends, therefore, on the proper estimation of the parties' 
ability to bargain in close corporations. This issue is a matter of great 
debate. 130 Suffice it to say that if the ultimate conclusion on the bargain-
ing issue is relatively positive, then probably little purpose is served by 
constraining the parties' ability to use a charter-option provision that 
limits personal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty. There may be 
130. Compare O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Re-
form, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 881 (1977) ("statutory protection is needed for minority 
shareholders who fail to bargain for and obtain protective contractual arrange-
ments") with Easterbrook & Fischel, Close Corporations, supra note SO, at 284 ("The 
extent to which minority shareholders are ignorant of problems they might face and 
thus fail to protect themselves is impossible to tell."). 
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some risk, however, that the presence of broad exculpatory provisions in 
transitional situations may exacerbate freeze-out problems. 
V. CONCLUSION 
When one is asked to comment upon new legislation, the irresistible 
temptation is to criticize, and to insist that the drafters should have been 
more sensitive to the concerns raised by the critic. This article certainly 
contains its fair share of criticism and second-guessing, but it also con-
tains a fair amount of praise, as its title suggests. The authorization of a 
limit on liability for breach of the duty of care has been described as a 
sensible reinforcement of the traditional approach to that duty. Simi-
larly, the Maryland statute's extension of that protection to officers as 
well as directors has been described as justifiable and useful. 
It is fair to conclude, therefore, that the Maryland statute's ap-
proach to the duty of care makes a positive contribution to the govern-
ance of public corporations. The approach to the duty of loyalty, 
however, is less positive. This is not to suggest that the drafters intended 
to undermine the duty of loyalty, or that they wished to enable corporate 
managers to abuse their office with impunity. The statute's duty of loy-
alty problem is rather an example of the law of unintended consequences. 
The drafters intended to mitigate the consequences of sharply increased 
costs of D & 0 liability insurance, but they accomplished that goal 
through excessively broad means that have created needless uncertainty 
about the nature and effects of the duty of loyalty. 
The ultimate significance of that uncertainty will depend upon how 
the courts interpret the different loyalty exclusions under the Maryland 
and Delaware statutes, so it is perhaps too early to enter a final verdict on 
the Maryland legislation. In the meantime, a third cheer for the Mary-
land director and officer liability statute must be postponed. 
